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THE INFLUENCE OF ECOLOGICAL SCIENCE ON




This symposium explores how changing paradigms in ecology
have influenced environmental law and policy, and how the current
paradigm may influence laws and regulatory programs built on an ear-
lier paradigm. Environmental law is a joint product of economics,
ethics and science, but science is the driving force. Science-primarily
ecology and toxicology-gives content to ethics and economics.
Ecology is a well-recognized branch of biological science that
deals with the interrelationship between living things and their envi-
ronment. One of ecology's primary contributions to modern environ-
mental law has been to show how an action that impacted one species
of plant or animal might indirectly impact many other species, e.g.,
eagles died from eating fish that ate worms that ate DDT. In the early
days of the environmental movement, the ecologists' work was popu-
larized as "everything is related to everything else." This led to the
common perception that any human modification of the environment
was likely to be harmful in some direct or indirect way.
Environmental law frequently relied on ecology as interpreted by
scientist-philosophers and those who read these popularizers. Current
environmental law, however, rests on a simple ecological paradigm
which the science has now rejected and replaced with a more complex,
open-ended model. The idea that "Nature knows best: leave her
alone" fit with the secular-spiritual preservation movement which
transformed itself into environmentalism in the 1960s. "Leave her
alone" principles derive from classic ecological theories which posited
equilibrium as the highest state of natural systems and viewed ecosys-
tems as inherently fragile and thus vulnerable to human degradation.
Ecology was an attractive basis for law because it was thought to yield
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** Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Co-Director, Chicago-Kent College of
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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
scientific laws which could form the basis for the intense regulation of
land and resource use.
In recent years, classic ecology has been challenged by newer eco-
logical theories which have potentially significant implications for en-
vironmental regulation. These new theories vary, but they tend to see
the environment as in a process of constant change rather than in
search of a stable end-state. Environmental law is just beginning to
adapt to the new paradigm.
As environmental law adapts to changing ecological theories, it is
useful to review the influence of ecological science on American law
in its historical context. Contrary to popular opinion, ecology was not
invented in the 1960s. Ecology has been recognized as an important
branch of biological science for just over a century. Throughout that
time, ecology has continually affected the way that legal theory and
legal institutions have developed.
This introduction sets the stage for the scientific and legal analysis
of the new paradigm by a distinguished group of scientists and lawyers
by summarizing the history of ecology's influence on law. We review
four periods during the last century when new ecological ideas were
becoming established. In each period, the current thinking in ecology
provided support for changes in public policy and legal institutions. A
review of the impact of past changes in ecological thinking may shed
light on the ways in which today's "new paradigm" in ecological sci-
ence will affect environmental law.
Part I of the article looks at the Progressive era and the influence
of ecology on the jurisprudence of that period through the work of the
ecologist-turned-lawyer, Roscoe Pound. Part II focuses on the con-
cepts of succession, climax and equilibrium developed by Frederic
Clements and their influence on American land planning programs in
the 1920s and 1930s. Part III examines the role of the leading British
ecologist, Sir Arthur Tansley, in replacing the end-state organismic
theories of Clements with a more complex theory of the ecosystem.
Part IV traces the development of Eugene Odum's theory of the
ecosystem as a mechanical system tending toward harmony and order,
its adoption as the scientific basis for modern environmental law, and
its subsequent replacement by a chaos-theory driven, non-equilibrium
paradigm.
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I. ECOLOGY IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: AN ENGINE OF SOCIAL
AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS
The social sciences in the late nineteenth century were heavily
influenced by the physical sciences, especially Darwin's theory of
evolution.' Social Darwinism was the term used to characterize the
application of Darwin's theories of adaptation and fitness to human
affairs. 2 One of the most prominent Social Darwinists, Yale sociolo-
gist William Graham Sumner, coined the earthy epigram that symbol-
ized the period: "[R]oot, hog or die!"'3 To the Social Darwinists,
Darwin's concept of the survival of the fittest meant that those human
individuals who became successful must be reflecting innate charac-
teristics of fitness-a theory that had a natural appeal to many of
those who had achieved success. 4
Sumner and his colleagues believed that human society was in-
herently competitive because all living things were inherently compet-
itive. Some scientists, however, questioned whether the biological
evidence supported such an individualistic viewpoint: It had long been
noted that certain plants and animals often formed mutually interde-
pendent associations. The field of ecology took its place in the natural
sciences out of the study of those interrelationships. 5
Ecology was recognized as a legitimate field of the biological sci-
ences in 1893,6 and even before it was formally recognized, it was be-
ginning to affect the intellectual climate beyond the boundaries of
biology.7 In the era of new world exploration, biology had empha-
sized the classification of the many specimens of plants and animals
brought back from places newly discovered by European science. 8
Too often the specimen was removed from its natural context and had
to be classified almost exclusively by its physical characteristics as ob-
served in the museum. 9 As biologists found new bases of operations
1. See, e.g., PETER J. BOWLER, EVOLUTION: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 187-237 (1983).
2. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1955).
3. BOWLER, supra note 1, at 287.
4. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645
(1985).
5. DONALD WORSTER, NATURE'S ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL IDEAS 194
(1985).
6. ROBERT P. MCINTOSH, THE BACKGROUND OF ECOLOGY 294 (1985).
7. WORSTER, supra note 5, at 133-40.
8. FREDERIC E. CLEMENTS, RESEARCH METHODS IN ECOLOGY 3 (1905). Biology was
dominated by Linnaean taxonomy with its emphasis on physiology rather than interaction.
WORSTER, supra note 5, at 31-39. The effect of Linnaeus on the development of ecology in
Sweden is discussed in THOMAS SODEROVIST, THE ECOLOGISTS 18-20 (1986).
9. MCINTOSH, supra note 6, at 41-42; CLEMENTS, supra note 8, at 13.
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outside older urban centers, which provided a better opportunity to
observe species in their native surroundings, they increasingly recog-
nized the need to study the interaction of plants and animals with
their surroundings and with each other. The science of ecology devel-
oped accordingly. 10
As the nineteenth century neared its end, the study of ecology
began to permeate the biology departments of American universi-
ties." In the 1890s, the University of Nebraska, perched on the prai-
rie, became a pioneer in the development of plant ecology under the
leadership of Charles Bessey.12 Two of his top students, Roscoe
Pound and Frederic Clements, went on to become very influential
figures in the application of ecology to American society.'
3
Roscoe Pound had the most immediate influence on the legal sys-
tem because of his switch from the study of biology to the study, prac-
tice and teaching of law. He obtained his Ph.D. in botany from
Nebraska in 1897 on the basis of his extensive work with fungi and
lichens, having already written (in cooperation with Clements) The
Phytogeography of Nebraska, a path-breaking work in ecology. 14
Pound was later to become a famous legal scholar. His jurisprudential
theories reflected his ecological training, which impressed on him two
important principles that would influence him throughout his life and,
in turn, influence the law of today's regulatory state. First, empiricism:
scientific thought did not proceed by deductive reasoning from
abstract principles, but from careful study of actual facts.15 Second,
interdependence: individual organisms could not be adequately under-
stood, except in the context of their physical surroundings.' 6
10. WORSTER, supra note 5, at 197.
11. MCINTOSH, supra note 6, at 41-42; WORSTER, supra note 5, at 206. For an analysis of
ecological study in continental Europe during this period, see ANNA BRAMWELL, ECOLOGY IN
THE 20TH CENTURY (1989).
12. RONALD C. TOBEY, SAVING THE PRAIRIES 38-45 (1981).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 14-97.
14. ROSCOE POUND & FREDERIC E. CLEMENTS, THE PHYTOGEOGRAPHY OF NEBRASKA
(1st ed. 1897). The work on the book was substantially complete at the time Pound received his
doctorate in 1897, but the plates of the original book were accidentally destroyed, so a second
and revised edition was published in 1900. RoscoE POUND & FREDERIC E. CLEMENTS, THE
PHYTOGEOGRAPHY OF NEBRASKA (2d ed. 1900). See generally DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE
POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 55-58 (1974).
15. Empirical research was seen as the foundation of all nineteenth century science. WOR-
STER, supra note 5, at 130.
16. The European ecologists, such as Drude and Warming, emphasized the mutual interde-
pendence of all elements of the natural environment. WORSTER, supra note 5, at 199-202.
Pound read many languages and studied Drude and Warming in German. WIGDOR, supra note
14, at 55.
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The emphasis on empirical study was an outgrowth of the work
that Pound and Clements performed on the botanical survey of Ne-
braska.17 In the course of their field work throughout the state, they
realized that many of their preconceptions about the composition of
plant communities were mistaken. Casual observers had typically
characterized plant communities by assuming that the showiest and
most easily observable species were dominant, but systematic study
often revealed that less noticeable species were actually more signifi-
cant.' 8 Pound and Clements pioneered the development of the "quad-
rat" method of documenting vegetation patterns by the use of
painstaking counts of individual organisms in randomly selected sam-
ple areas.' 9 The method that they helped develop is still in use today
to describe ecosystems and their components. 20
The second key principle of Pound's ecological thinking, the rec-
ognition of the interdependence of organisms, was a product of his
extensive study of fungi and lichen. Like other early ecologists, Pound
was becoming increasingly aware of the extent to which many species
of plants and animals lived in symbiotic relationships with each
other.21 Lichen were the epitome of interdependence: they consisted
of an alga and a fungus living together as if they were a single organ-
ism and often so dependent on each other that neither could survive
in the wild without the other.22 In one of his first botanical articles,
Symbiosis and Mutualism, Pound discussed the wide range of symbi-
otic behavior of plants, ranging from the pure parasitism of the mistle-
toe to the mutualism of the lichen.23 He pointed out the difficulty of
determining the extent to which symbiotic behavior was beneficial or
17. TOBEY, supra note 12, at 57-70. See WIGDOR, supra note 14, at 56-57.
18. TOBEY, supra note 12, at 69-70; MCI, OsH, supra note 6, at 133-34; FRANK B. GOLLEY,
A HISTORY OF THE ECOSYSTEM CONCEPT IN ECOLOGY 19-22 (1993).
19. Roscoe Pound & Frederic E. Clements, A Method of Determining the Abundance of
Secondary Species, 2 MINN. BOTANICAL STUD. 19 (1898).
20. "Within a decade of its invention, the quadrat method had been developed by the Ne-
braska scientists into the main method of scientific ecology." TOBEY, supra note 12, at 70. It
has, of course, been supplemented today by more complex forms of multivariate analysis. MCIN-
TOSH, supra note 6, at 144-45.
21. The idea of interdependence was not novel. Robert McIntosh notes:
[t]he somewhat waggish current statement about ecology as being everything con-
nected to everything else was specifically stated by Richard Bradley in 1721: "All Bod-
ies have some Dependance upon one another; and ... every distinct Part of Nature's
works is necessary for the Support of the rest; and ... if any one was wanting all the
rest must consequently be out of Order."
MCINrosH, supra note 6, at 69-70.
22. WORSTER, supra note 5, at 199-200.
23. Roscoe Pound, Symbiosis and Mutualism, 27 AM. NATURALIST 509 (1893).
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harmful to the host species without an understanding of the overall
context in which the plants lived.24
By the late nineteenth century, ecological ideas of empiricism and
interdependence were beginning to influence scholars in other fields.
The English botanist, Patrick Geddes, was writing about the implica-
tions of ecology for city planning.25 Lester Frank Ward, a biologist
turned sociologist, was an influential opponent of the Social
Darwinists' emphasis on individualism. 26 Edward Alsworth Ross,
who taught at the University of Nebraska while Pound was there, was
a prominent sociologist who admired Ward's ideas.27 Ward and Ross
emphasized the need to view society as a complex institution with its
own interests, 28 and they believed that humanity was evolving from
the narrow self-interest of earlier periods toward a collective reorgani-
zation of society through governmental institutions.29
By the time the University of Nebraska awarded Roscoe Pound
his Ph.D. in botany, he was already mastering a very different field-
law. He began the active practice of law in 1890, became a professor
of law at the University of Nebraska in 1899, and dean in 1903.30 His
legal scholarship soon attracted national attention, and he moved
quickly to the law schools of Northwestern, Chicago and eventually
Harvard, where he served as dean from 1916 to 1936.31
Pound was very interested in sociology and discussed it frequently
with Ross. 32 Pound saw in sociology the science for which he had
been searching vainly in the law, and he found in the sociology of
24. Id. at 519.
25. PATRICK GEDDES, CHAPTERS IN MODERN BOTANY (1893). See PHILIP BOARDMAN,
PATRICK GEDDES: MAKER OF THE FUTURE 132-35 (1944); Charles C. Adams, Patrick Geddes-
Botanist and Human Ecologist, 26 ECOLOGY 103 (1945) (reviewing BOARDMAN, supra); Helen
Meller, Cities and Evolution: Patrick Geddes as an International Prophet of Town Planning
Before 1914, in THE RISE OF MODERN URBAN PLANNING, 1800-1914, at 199 (Anthony Sutcliffe
ed., 1980). See also BRAMWELL, supra note 11, at 77-81.
26. DOROTHY Ross, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 88-94 (1991). For a dis-
cussion of Ward's influence on Pound, see Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 672-83. Among the
other noteworthy followers of Ward was Howard Washington Odum, a sociologist whose Insti-
tute for Research in Social Science at Chapel Hill was a prototype of such institutes. ROBERT C.
BANNISTER, SOCIOLOGY AND SCIENTisM: THE AMERICAN QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY, 1880-1940,
at 10 (1987). Odum was to make his own indirect contribution to ecology by fathering Howard
T. and Eugene Odum, prominent ecologists discussed infra at Part IV. See Peter J. Taylor, Tech-
nocratic Optimism, H. T. Odum, and the Partial Transformation of Ecological Metaphor After
World War II, 21 J. HIsT. BIOLOGY 213, 223-24 (1988).
27. See JULIUS WEINBERG, EDWARD ALSWORTH Ross AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF PROGRES-
SiViSM 31, 136 (1972).
28. Ross, supra note 26, at 91-92, 230-40.
29. Id. at 230-50.
30. WIGDOR, supra note 14, at 69-103.
31. See id. at 133-254.
32. See EDWARD A. Ross, SEVENTY YEARS OF IT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 89 (1936).
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Ward and Ross the scientific emphasis on empirical research and in-
terdependence that he had discovered in ecology. 33 This blending of
law and sociology allowed Roscoe Pound to become the leading theo-
retician of the Progressive movement,34 whose theories provided the
underpinning for natural resources conservation and, though rarely
acknowledged, for the modern environmental movement.
35
Pound was perceived as a brash but eloquent young critic of the
legal establishment.36 He criticized the legal profession for relying cr
the old "law in books" while ignoring the fact of social change. 37 He
proposed a new sociological jurisprudence which would use the law as
a tool for social engineering and would encourage legislation to rem-
edy the ills of society.38 This would be the "law in action." 39 He was
especially critical of the Social Darwinists for their emphasis on the
rights of the individual at the expense of the needs of society as a
whole.4° He argued that society was an interdependent whole that
was greater than the mere aggregation of the individuals that made up
its parts.41 He urged the courts to be receptive to social legislation
and to the factual context of social problems.
42
The two main themes of Pound's early writings on sociological
jurisprudence, empiricism, and interdependence, were an extension of
the ideas that grew out of his early work in ecology.43 Too many legal
scholars, he argued, were like the physiological taxonomists who
33. WIGDOR, supra note 14, at 112-13. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of
Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489, 506-07 (1912) (discussing Ward).
34. JAMES E. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870-1970, at 164-75 (1990); MORTON
J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL OR-
THODOXY 217-18 (1992).
35. See Richard D. Alexander, Biology and Law, in LAW, BIOLOGY AND CULTURE 200
(Margaret Gruter & Paul Bohannon eds., 2d ed. 1993).
36. WIGDOR, supra note 14, at 133-35. His early legal writings were crisp and pointed,
much different in style from the heavy prose of his later works. See id. at 285.
37. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 20-21 (1910).
38. Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607, 611-12
(1907).
39. It was only the early work of Pound, which he synthesized in The Scope and Purpose of
Sociological Jurisprudence, pts. 1-3, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140, 489
(1912), that influenced the legal system during the progressive era. His later work departed
significantly from his earlier ideas. See infra note 49.
40. Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 339,344, 346, 352
(1905) [hereinafter Philosophy of Law]; Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454,
457 (1909) [hereinafter Liberty of Contract]; Roscoe Pound, Enforcement of Law, 20 GREEN
BAG 401, 402 (1908) [hereinafter Enforcement of Law]. See EDWARD B. MCLEAN, LAW AND
CIVILIZATION: THE LEGAL THOUGHT OF ROSCOE POUND 194-202 (1992).
41. What the individual does, Pound wrote, "is quite as much wrought through him by soci-
ety as wrought by himself alone." Philosophy of Law, supra note 40, at 346.
42. Pound, supra note 37, at 35-36.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 17-24.
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never got outside the herbarium and into the field. 44 And because
they did not see how interdependent their individual specimens really
were, they often overemphasized the importance of the individual and
downplayed the role of social interaction.45
By 1912, the essential elements of what later scholars have called
the "Poundian paradigm" were in place. 46 To the Progressive political
movement of that era, the "law in action" embodied many of their
goals: For pragmatic scholars and activist lawyers, sociological juris-
prudence quickly became a popular label to attach to a range of ongo-
ing reforms.47 Boston attorney Louis Brandeis used it to justify his
successful efforts to persuade appellate courts to consider data on so-
cial problems that had not been included in the trial record. 48 And
legislators who created administrative agencies with broad regulatory
power over business argued that these agencies provided the empirical
fact-finding capabilities that Pound said were needed. 49
Pound the Dean became more conservative than Pound the aspir-
ing professor, but younger legal scholars used his earlier ideas as the
basis for the legal realism movement of the 1930s.50 Although
Pound's ideas had changed by then, his early writings embodied the
first major impact of ecological science on the legal system.
II.
Frederic Clements did not follow his friend Roscoe Pound into
the law but stayed in botany. He went on to become the most famous
American ecologist of the first half of the twentieth century.51 By the
1930s, his theories of ecology had become so embedded in scientific
44. RoscoE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 128-29 (1923). See E. Victor
Walter, Legal Ecology of Roscoe Pound, 4 MIAMI L.Q. 178, 185-86 (1950). Pound argued in
favor of more empirical research into the way that courts actually operated. See PAUL SAYRE,
THE LIFE OF ROSCOE POUND 268-69 (1948) (quoting a letter from Pound to Justice Holmes).
45. Pound wrote that sociological jurisprudence was a "movement for putting the human
factor in the central place and relegating logic to its true position as an instrument .. " Liberty
of Contract, supra note 40, at 464.
46. HERGET, supra note 34, at 147.
47. See, e.g., JOHN W. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE, 1908-1940, at 129-35 (1981).
48. Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461, 464, 470 (1916).
49. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 190-98
(1981). By 1940, however, Pound became seriously disillusioned with the administrative state as
it had evolved under Roosevelt. HORWITZ, supra note 34, at 170-182; WIGDOR, supra note 14, at
266-67.
50. WIGDOR, supra note 14, at 255-65; HORWITZ, supra note 34, at 170-82. During the
1930s, the legal realists turned Yale Law School into the center of cutting-edge legal theory, but
in the 1920s under Pound, "the Harvard approach was considered to be the truly 'progressive'
one." GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 726 n.8 (1994).
51. WORSTER, supra note 5, at 209; MCINTOSH, supra note 6, at 76-85.
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thinking that they reinforced a static concept of the future landscape
that became known as end-state planning.
5 2
Clements liked to label his theory of ecology as succession, and
he wrote extensively about natural processes by which one plant com-
munity replaces another in successive waves. 53 But the part of his the-
ory that had the greatest influence on public policy was not succession
itself, but his contention that succession eventually would end in a cli-
max state, at which point succession would cease because the land-
scape had reached its natural condition of equilibrium.54 Each plant
and animal species would then occupy its niche in perpetual har-
mony.55 Of course, fire, flood, or other natural event might disrupt
such harmony, but in the long run it would not matter because the
process of succession would begin again and eventually return to the
climax condition.5
6
The idea of climax and equilibrium fell on fertile ground. For
centuries, many theologically inclined students of science had inferred
a balance of nature, divinely provided until the disrupters of the Gar-
den of Eden bungled things.57 They argued that humans should
search to fit themselves into the framework of natural processes so
that a condition of permanent stability could be re-established. 58
The initial building block of Clements' ecology was the plant
community. 59 He thought that each such community functioned as a
separate unit in the ecological process.60 Other biologists of the pe-
riod, such as Hart Merriam, fostered this idea of separate and in-
dependent communities through the popularization of maps showing
the separation of the natural world into specific life zones, each
52. See infra text accompanying notes 80-84.
53. See, e.g., JOHN E. WEAVER & FREDERIC E. CLEMENTS, PLANT ECOLOGY 60-79 (2d ed.
1938).
54. Frederic E. Clements, The Nature and Structure of the Climax, 24 J. ECOLOGY 252, 255-
56 (1936).
55. WEAVER & CLEMENTS, supra note 53, at 261; MCINTOSH, supra note 6, at 104-05; WOR-
STER, supra note 5, at 211.
56. Weaver and Clements exemplify this position:
While the climax is permanent because of its entire harmony with a stable habitat, the
equilibrium is a dynamic one and not static. Superficial adjustments occur with the
season, year, or cycle.... While change is constantly and universally at work, in the
absence of civilized man this is within the fabric of the climax and not destructive of it.
WEAVER & CLEMENTS, supra note 53, at 80.
57. WORSTER, supra note 5, at 138-43.
58. PETER J. BOWLER, THE NORTON HISTORY OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES 507-09
(1993); WORSTER, supra note 5, at 39-53.
59. MCINTOSH, supra note 6, at 77-78.
60. Id. at 81.
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adapted to certain climatic and geographic conditions. 61 As Clements'
thinking progressed, he increasingly began to think of such communi-
ties and their animal inhabitants as akin to individual organisms that
possessed an identity greater than the sum of their parts.62 Such orga-
nismic theories were extremely controversial,63 but Clements' basic
theory of succession and climax dominated American ecology
throughout the first half of the twentieth century.64 The idea of cli-
max coincided nicely with the field observations of those biological
scientists who were increasingly taking up residence in the more newly
settled regions of the country and who, because they could obtain lit-
tle historical data about landscape changes in their areas, had to rely
on snapshot observations, the value of which would be enhanced if it
could be assumed that the natural areas that they observed were rep-
resentative of a permanent climax condition.
65
Like Darwinian evolution, Clementsian ecology almost begged to
be translated into sociology. 66 Were human communities, like plant
communities, passing through succession in a natural process that
would end in a stable state of equilibrium? Social scientists seized on
this idea almost as readily as they had adapted the Darwinian struggle
as their own. 67 Science, they believed, could assist society through
61. KEIR B. STERLING, LAST OF THE NATURALISTS: THE CAREER OF C. HART MERRIAM
270-97 (1974). See also WORSTER, supra note 5, at 195-96.
62. Clements believed "the community is a complex organism of a wholly different order
from the individual plant or animal, but nevertheless an organic entity with functions and struc-
ture." FREDERIC E. CLEMENTS, DYNAMICS OF VEGETATION 247 (B.W. Allred & Edith S. Cle-
ments eds., 1949). Many, but not all, American specialists in animal ecology supported
Clements' theories, and one group at the University of Chicago argued that "ecological interde-
pendence symbolized Nature's overall tendency to evolve in the direction of greater integration,
a tendency that was continued by the development of more co-operation in human society."
BOWLER, supra note 58, at 527-28. See generally GREGG MITMAN, THE STATE OF NATURE:
ECOLOGY, COMMUNITY AND AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT, 1900-1950 (1992) (discussing the
Chicago school of animal ecologists).
63. WORSTER, supra note 5, at 317-38.
64. GOLLEY, supra note 18, at 23-24; MCINTOSH, supra note 6, at 82-83. Clements' ideas
were less popular in Europe. "From a European perspective it seemed ridiculous to speak of
natural climaxes that were inherently superior to any other form of vegetation in the region.
Many of the most stable European environments were maintained by constant human activity."
BOWLER, supra note 58, at 525.
65. FREDERIC E. CLEMENTS, PLANT SUCCESSION 98-99 (1916) ("The progressive invasion
typical of succession everywhere produces stabilization . . ." and an "increase of dominance,
culminating in a stable climax .... Such a climax is permanent because of its entire harmony
with a stable habitat."). See WORSTER, supra note 5, at 197-206; MCINTosH, supra note 6, at 77;
GOLLEY, supra note 18, at 23-24.
66. WORSTER, supra note 5, at 319-24.
67. Organismic theories were not new. Herbert Spencer and some of the Social Darwinists
also viewed human society as similar to an organism. STOW PERSONS, AMERICAN MINDS: A
HISTORY OF IDEAS 227-28 (1958). And the "technocracy" movement that began in the 1920s
was allied with organismic ecology. See Taylor, supra note 26, at 234-36.
[Vol. 69:847
INFLUENCE OF ECOLOGICAL SCIENCE
"regional planning, based upon economic analysis" that would pre-
vent those activities that might disrupt the natural equilibria and
thereby ensure "a truly sound economic layout of the metropolis.
'68
A human ecology movement began to gain adherents in the 1920s.
69
It provided an intellectual rationale for legal systems created to organ-
ize human use of land that became popular during this period.
70 If
there was a permanent ideal use for every piece of land, the law ought
to give that use a protected status and throw up roadblocks to activi-
ties that would conflict with that use.71 This climax condition became
equated in the law with the term "highest and best use," which be-
came a key concept in the development of land use law during this
period.
72
The 1920s, in particular, provided conditions quite receptive to an
idea based on natural progress toward a stable state. Rapid advances
in technology were changing people's lifestyles at an unprecedented
68. Robert M. Haig, Toward an Understanding of the Metropolis: The Assignment of Activi-
ties to Areas in Urban Regions, 40 Q. J. ECON. 402,434 (1926). See also HARVEY W. ZORBAUGH,
THE GOLD COAST AND THE SLUM 272-73 (1929); SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 195-98
(1969).
69. See ROBERT E.L. FARIS, CHICAGO SOCIOLOGY, 1920-1932 (1967); FRED H. MATTHEWS,
QUEST FOR AN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY: ROBERT E. PARK AND THE CHICAGO SCHOOL (1977);
AMOS H. HAWLEY, HUMAN ECOLOGY (1986).
70. The human ecologists looked at the city as if it were a living thing. University of Chi-
cago sociologist Robert Ezra Park thought of the city as a "kind of psychophysical mechanism"
that "possesses a moral as well as a physical organization" and has a "life quite of its own."
Robert E. Park, The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the Urban
Environment, in THE CITY 1, 2-4 (Robert E. Park et al. eds., 1925). He believed that personal
tastes and convenience, vocational and economic interests "infallibly tend to segregate and thus
to classify the populations of great cities," so that the city "acquires an organization and distribu-
tion of population which is neither designed nor controlled." Id. at 5. The human ecologists saw
urban development as a process by which "a uniform cost type of structure" gradually dominates
a neighborhood and eliminates any other types that vary widely from the norm, and they called
such neighborhoods "natural areas," borrowing the term from plant ecology. Roderick D. Mc-
Kenzie, The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human Community, in THE CITY, supra, at
77. Another of Park's colleagues, Ernest W. Burgess, delved deeply into biological symbolism in
his description of urban growth as a result of "organization and disorganization analogous to the
anabolic and katabolic processes of metabolism in the body." Ernest W. Burgess, The Growth of
the City: An Introduction to a Research Project, in THE CITY, supra, at 47, 53. The constant
changes taking place he called "mobility," which was "a measure both of expansion and metabo-
lism, susceptible to precise quantitative formulation, so that it may be regarded almost literally
as the pulse of the community." Id. at 61. This mobility caused the inevitable "invasion" of
neighborhoods, just as one plant community invaded another in a process known as succession.
Id. See also Robert E. Park, Succession, an Ecological Concept, 1 AM. Soc. REV. 171 (1936).
71. See, e.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1934). See also Jeremy Paul, The
Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1472-73 (1991).
72. See JULIUS L. SACKMAN & PATRICK J. ROMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN § 12B.12, at 107, 120-28 (3d ed. 1990) ("Evidence may be adduced showing only the natu-
rally adapted uses of the property in its present condition. The owner's actual plans or hopes for
the future are completely irrelevant .... [I]n determining market value, consideration may be




pace. 73 The illusion of permanent prosperity and peace led many peo-
ple to believe that wars and depressions were things of the past.74 De-
mographers projected that the need to accommodate high rates of
population growth was over, and that the country's total population
might even begin to drop as the year 2000 arrived.75 The Progressive
conservationists had achieved enough success that the concern over
loss of natural resources was alleviated and the goal of stable and re-
newable resources seemed realistic.
76
The idea of national planning to identify future equilibria began
in the heady atmosphere of 1920s confidence. 77 President Hoover,
who combined an entrepreneur's admiration for private initiative with
an engineer's love for big plans, began the process of natural re-
sources planning even before he took office.78 Wesley Mitchell, the
Columbia economist who headed what today we would call Hoover's
transition team, called for the development of a technique of balance
to keep production and both natural and human resources in
equilibrium.
79
Hoover promoted the idea of zoning, which was perceived at that
time as a way of identifying and perpetuating the climax condition of
human communities.80 Throughout the United States, city after city
prepared plans that projected a future use of every parcel of land in
73. The increasing availability of automobiles in the 1920s brought about a mass migration
of city dwellers to new homes in newly created suburban communities designed to embody a
permanent "climax" of idyllic residential life. See, e.g., KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS
FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 174-77 (1985); ScoTr DONALDSON,
THE SUBURAN MYTH 35-36 (1969); ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS: THE RISE AND
FALL OF SUBURBIA 156-58 (1987).
74. " 'Here stands our country, an example of tranquility at home, a patron of tranquility
abroad,' said President Coolidge on March 4, 1925." ROGER BUTrERFIELD, THE AMERICAN
PAST 390 (1957).
75. MEL SCOTr, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890, at 271-72 (1969).
76. CLEMENTS, supra note 62, at 254-57. See generally STEPHEN Fox, JOHN MUIR AND HIS
LEGACY: THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 148-82 (1981).
77. Peter L. Abeles, Planning and Zoning, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 122, 127
(Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989); M. CHRISTINE BOYER, DREAMING THE RA-
TIONAL CITY: THE MYTH OF AMERICAN CITY PLANNING 221 (1983).
78. See BOYER, supra note 77, at 146-47; SCOTr, supra note 75, at 273-78. Hoover's view of
the role of government reflected many of the same "progressive" ideas that Pound had espoused.
HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE CABINET AND THE PRESI-
DENCY, 1920-1933, at 167-68 (1952). Hoover had an interest in conservation that stemmed from
a lifelong love of fishing. See Fox, supra note 76, at 168.
79. SCOTT, supra note 75, at 273-74.
80. Laurence C. Gerckens, Historical Development of American City Planning, in THE
PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING 21, 39-40 (Frank S. So et al. eds., 1979). See
RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 116-20 (1966); BOYER, supra note 77, at 69, 79, 141,
152-53.
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their jurisdiction.81 Some neighborhoods were seen as climax commu-
nities that needed protection, while others were merely in a transi-
tional state where further succession was to be encouraged. 82 Frank
Lloyd Wright's Broadacre City typified the idealized and permanent
environment toward which Americans were taught to aspire.83 End-
state planners issued the "Plan for the year X" as if once X arrived the
process of change would end.
84
The economic depression that began the thirties extinguished the
optimism with which national planning began, but with the election of
Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, planning efforts were redoubled. 85
Although unemployment was his most immediate concern, Roosevelt
had a lengthy background in conservation and saw a great need for
balanced management of natural resources. 86 The first dramatic pro-
ject of the New Deal, the Civilian Conservation Corps, was in theory
an effort to use surplus labor to increase the renewability and stability
of natural resources. 87 On a much larger scale, Roosevelt saw re-
gional planning as the way to provide long term stability for entire
regions; the Tennessee Valley Authority was to be the prototype that
merged the flexibility of the independent corporation with the power
of government to create a region in which both the natural and social
resources would be managed in equilibrium.
88
Harold Ickes, who served as Secretary of the Interior during vir-
tually the entire Roosevelt administration, oversaw numerous innova-
81. Charles M. Haar, The Social Control of Urban Space, in CITIES AND SPACE: THE Fu-
TURE USE OF URBAN LAND 175, 200 (Lowden Wingo, Jr. ed., 1963) ("Rather than dictating what
the planner deems to be desirable-which seems to be a common misconception among the
laity-the aim of planning may be to eliminate the inefficiencies of the market mechanism.").
82. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 203-04
(1968). See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA 59-63 (1971); Abeles, supra note
77, at 127.
83. William H. Wilson, The Ideology, Aesthetics and Politics of the City Beautiful Movement,
in THE RISE OF MODERN URBAN PLANNING, 1800-1914, supra note 25, at 165, 185.
84. F. STUART CHAPIN, JR. & EDWARD J. KAISER, URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 91 (3d ed.
1979) ("The land use plan has been the traditional focus of land use planning and ... presents a
future land use pattern as a goal form."). See also HARVEY S. PERLOFF, PLANNING THE POST-
INDUSTRIAL CITY 182-87 (1980). For more recent critiques of end-state planning, see MELVILLE
C. BRANCH, CONTINUOUS CITY PLANNING 41-92 (1981); Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing:
Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 839, 874-98 (1983).
85. SCOTT, supra note 75, at 300-11.
86. See generally 1, 2 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT & CONSERVATION, 1911-1945 (Edgar B.
Nixon ed., 1957) [hereinafter ROOSEVELT & CONSERVATION]. Roosevelt's policies for range
and forest land are analyzed in SAMUEL T. DANA & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE
POLICY 142-78 (2d ed. 1980). See also Fox, supra note 76, at 183-217.
87. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW
DEAL 335-41 (1959).
88. 2 ROOSEVELT & CONSERVATION, supra note 86, at 613-15. See SCHLESINGER, supra
note 87, at 319-34.
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tions directed toward the stabilization of the nation's resources. 89 The
Taylor Grazing Act was intended to correct overuse of the public
range lands to ensure that they remained a renewable resource. 90 The
National Park Service's role was greatly expanded and large areas of
climax forest were designated as primitive areas.91 And the Natural
Resources Planning Board was designed to provide an overall plan for
the functioning of the various programs.
92
The 1930s also brought innovations in the Agriculture Depart-
ment: The renewability of resources (which today would be called
sustainable development) became a key objective of the Forest Ser-
vice.93 And as the drought of the period heightened the concern over
soil erosion, agricultural scientists searched for ways to perfect the
means of agricultural production so that farming areas could achieve
the artificial equivalent of a climax state.94
Through all of these programs ran the thread of the holistic and
almost mystical assumption of the perfectibility of nature that charac-
terized Clementsian ecology.95 Plans were not thought of as processes
for adapting to change, but as visions of an ideal future that, once
achieved, would avoid the need for additional change. 96 Like the
builders of suburban residential communities or the planners of na-
tional parks, scientists of the day tended to emphasize the objective of
stability rather than the need for adaptability to ongoing change.
97
89. See Fox, supra note 76, at 200-03.
90. See WILLIAM L. GRAF, WILDERNESS PRESERVATION AND THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLIONS
141-53 (1990).
91. RONALD A. FORESTA, AMERICA'S NATIONAL PARKS AND THEIR KEEPERS 40-43 (1984).
See also 1 ROOSEVELT & CONSERVATION, supra note 86, at 321-24. On the designation of primi-
tive areas, see DONALD N. BALDWIN, THE QUIET REVOLUTION: GRASS ROOTS OF TODAY'S
WILDERNESS PRESERVATION MOVEMENT 203 (1972).
92. 2 ROOSEVELT & CONSERVATION, supra note 86, at 323-25. See BOYER, supra note 77,
at 217-25. For insight into the politics surrounding the creation of the board, see HAROLD L.
ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THE FIRST THOUSAND DAYS, 1933-1936, at
171-72 (1953).
93. MARION CLAWSON ET AL., LAND FOR THE FUTURE 298 (1960). On the New Deal ap-
proach to forestry, see HENRY CLEPPER, PROFESSIONAL FORESTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 147-
51 (1971). See also J. Douglas Helms, Walter Lowdermilk's Journey: Forester to Land Conserva-
tionist, 8 ENVTL. REV. 133 (1984).
94. "The ultimate objective of national action" is "a secure land resource, adequate perma-
nently to sustain the national economy .... HUGH H. BENNETT, SOIL CONSERVATION 313
(1939). For the impact of the switch from cattle to wheat in the sand hill region of Clements'
home state, see PAUL B. SEARS, DESERTS ON THE MARCH 53-58 (1949). Clements saw the de-
cline of his native state as evidence of the failure to pay attention to the principles of ecology.
WORSTER, supra note 5, at 235.
95. JOHN PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE 173-74 (1974).
96. CLEMENTS, supra note 62, at 254-57. See SCOTT, supra note 75, at 349-52.
97. GOLLEY, supra note 18, at 24-26. For example, wildlife was to be protected through the
creation of "refuges" that would be "inviolate sanctuaries" forever. Richard J. Fink, The Na-
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III.
The idea that the plants and animals living in a particular area
formed an interdependent community was a dramatic breakthrough at
the beginning of the twentieth century when most people had been
educated to differentiate elements of the biota only by the place of the
individual species on the "great chain of being." By the 1930s, how-
ever, some ecologists began to question whether even Clements and
the other community ecologists had been thinking on too small a
scale. Still, the idea of a stable, functioning system remained.
The concept of an ecosystem as a functioning, holistic, and inher-
ently stable system vulnerable to serious and long-term insults from a
wide variety of human activities drives the biodiversity branch of
modern environmental law as well as a substantial part of the case
against toxic pollutants. This ecosystem focus defined the distinctive-
ness of ecology as a science and provided a concrete, visible rationale
for environmental regulation. The story of the idea's triumph is a fas-
cinating example of the power of paradigms which resonate with
deeply held non-scientific values to capture the imagination of scien-
tists. It is also a story of the strengths and weaknesses of tying regula-
tory justifications and resource management programs to science
when the science is still in the theoretical and experimental stage.
The ecosystem paradigm replaced Clements' theory that plant
communities were an organism rather than a system of individual
plants responding to various stimuli. A British ecologist floated the
ecosystem concept as a theory in 1935, and within fifteen years it be-
came an established scientific paradigm.98 Sir Alfred George Tansley,
a distinguished Oxbridge ecologist and longtime friend and follower
of Clements, was impressed with the progress of physics at the Caven-
dish Laboratory in Cambridge and proposed a conception, the ecosys-
tem, to focus the science on a system which permitted nonprogressive
vegetational change. "From Tansley's new 'systematic' point of view,
systems-not organisms-underwent evolution." 99 An ecosystem
was defined as "the whole system (in the sense of physics), including
not only the organism-complex, but also the whole complex of physi-
cal factors forming what we call the environment of the biome-the
tional Wildlife Refuges: Theory, Practice, and Prospect, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 13-15
(1994).
98. The scientific story is told in GOLLEY, supra note 18.
99. TOBEY, supra note 12, at 177.
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habitat factors in the widest sense."'10 Succession became a process
rather than an end-state.
Tansley's shift from an organism to a system also carried with it
the longstanding scientific belief that systems tended toward equilib-
rium. 101 The idea of a "holistic ... ecological concept that combined
living organisms and the physical environment into a system"'10 2 was a
theory in the grand scientific tradition: it was not based on field ob-
servations. Two American ecologists, Ralph Lindeman and Eugene
Odum, took the next step and made Tansley's theory operational. In
so doing, they paved the way for the shift in environmental discourse
from the aesthetic and spiritual to the scientific. The two modes of
analysis had long been intertwined, 10 3 but the case for what we now
call ecosystem preservation was primarily made on aesthetic or moral
grounds. For example, in a 1930 article, Wilderness Esthetics,1°4 Rob-
ert Marshall, one of the major proponents of wilderness preservation,
contrasted the "dynamic beauty" of primitive areas to the static
beauty of a Gothic cathedral and argued that "wilderness furnishes
perhaps the best opportunity for pure esthetic enjoyment."' 05
The ecosystem concept was made operational in Madison, Wis-
consin-a historic center of applied progressivism in the United
States. A University of Wisconsin ecologist, Ralph Lindeman, applied
the ecosystem concept to the study of a Wisconsin lake and developed
the building blocks of modern ecology "such as food webs, food
chains, trophic levels, productivity, metabolism, energy flow, and eco-
logical succession.' 1 6 Lindeman posited that if one determined the
food habits, feeding coefficients, metabolism and growth of the domi-
nant species in an ecosystem, one could extrapolate to all species, es-
pecially rare ones. Lindeman's research has since been criticized as
overly simplistic and taxonomic, 0 7 but the ideas that the trophic func-
100. GOLLEY, supra note 18, at 8.
101. TOBEY, supra note 12, at 179.
102. GOLLEY, supra note 18, at 8.
103. Tansley was equally at home among philosophers and nature writers. A former student
of his has observed, "if you scratch a biologist you will find a philosopher." Sir Harry Godwin,
Sir Arthur Tansley: The Man and the Subject, 65 J. ECOLOGY 1, 23 (1977). More generally,
ecology has always had to grapple with the tension between its status as a pure, thus neutral,
science and the argument that ecological understanding is value laden and thus ecologists have
the right (and perhaps the duty) to apply their insights to law and public policy. See MCINTosH,
supra note 6, at 308-23.
104. Robert Marshall, Wilderness Esthetics, reprinted in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF CON-
SERVATION IN AMERICA 78 (Robert McHenry & Charles Van Doren eds., 1972).
105. Id. at 80.
106. GOLLEY, supra note 18, at 76.
107. Id. at 77.
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tion is central to understanding a system and that all biological events
could be reduced to energy flow were a powerful innovation. 108 It
greatly influenced post-World War II ecologists109 such as Eugene
Odum who "perfected" and popularized it in the 1950s and 1960s.
IV.
A. Equilibrium Theory Circa 1968
To supplement the spiritual basis of the movement, environ-
mentalism and environmental law quickly borrowed its basic princi-
ples from three disciplines: economics, engineering and ecology.
Each has made important and related contributions, but ecology re-
mains the foundation of environmental law because it informed soci-
ety about the adverse consequences of a wide range of human activity.
Welfare economics' theory of external costs provided an explanation
of environmental costs such as pollution and a justification for govern-
ment intervention to limit emissions and other human activity. Engi-
neering contributed the idea of technology-forcing performance
standards to mandate pollution reduction levels. Each theory made a
major contribution to environmentalism but ecology is primes internus
because it provided the basic rationale for all environmental protec-
tion: leave nature alone. Later, philosophers purported to raise a
complex and controversial scientific theory to a Kantian and non-
homocentric ethic,110 but this effort has at best only reinforced sci-
ence's claim that there are important practical reasons for society to
worry about the magnitude of human-caused ecosystem disturbance.
In the late 1960s, the perceived teachings of ecology were quickly
and uncritically incorporated into environmental law and manage-
ment. Modern environmentalism was a visceral reaction to visible and
spectacular pollution insults and public works projects that destroyed
natural areas. National conservation group opposition to multiple
purpose dams in the 1950s paved the way for environmentalism, but
the movement lacked a scientific theory or any theory for that matter.
It achieved political and popular success on neo-pagan theories that
108. See MclrrosH, supra note 6, at 196-97.
109. See Robert E. Cook, Raymond Lindeman and the Trophic-Dynamic Concept in Ecol-
ogy, 198 SCIENCE 22 (1977).
110. E.g., J. BAIRD CALLICOTT, IN DEFENSE OF THE LAND ETHIC (1989).
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nature-at least the landscape of the western part of the United
States-was divine.
111
The adoption of ecology as the ground norm of environmentalism
and environmental law bears close examination because of dramatic
changes in ecology since its initial incorporation into environmental
law. There is a long and troubled history of the application of science
to natural resources management in this country, 112 but in 1968 ecol-
ogy offered the hope of coherent and rational resources management
which had eluded society in the past. Four individuals-a wildlife
manager, Aldo Leopold, the leading ecologist of the post World War
II generation, Eugene Odum, along with his equally distinguished
ecologist brother Howard, and political scientist, Lynton K. Cald-
well-played leading roles in the popularization of ecological ideas.
Professor Caldwell's creative contribution, the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act,113 is the most enduring legal application of ecology.
NEPA is the first piece of federal legislation to raise ecology to a star
status. The concept of environmental assessment, along with risk as-
sessment, remains one of the few innovative operational ideas of envi-
ronmental law. It rests on the premise that ecology could provide the
rationality to guide administrative action.
In the late 1960s, ecology was an under-funded low status science
out of step with the reductionism of biology, but one with great appeal
to policy makers. The most attractive idea was the theory of general
equilibrium at both the population and ecosystem level. 114 Tansley
crystallized the concept of "relatively stable dynamic equilibrium" in
1935,1 5 and Aldo Leopold popularized it in his posthumous A Sand
County Almanac.116 In turn, these ideas drew on the image of bal-
anced nature which was central to both the Christian and Enlighten-
ment world view. 117 For example, the idea of the balance of nature
111. The connection between John Muir's strict Presbyterian upbringing and his subsequent
nature worship has been noted by his biographers. E.g., STEPHEN Fox, THE AMERICAN CON-
SERVATION MOVEMENT: JOHN MUIR AND His LEGACY (1981).
112. See GRAF, supra note 90.
113. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND
POLICY 1082-83 (1992).
114. In an interesting paper, the late Kenneth Boulding identified the concept of a general
equilibrium as one of the five similarities between ecology and economics. Kenneth E. Bould-
ing, Economics and Ecology, in FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS OF NORTH AMERICA 225, 226 (F. Fra-
ser Darling & John P. Milton eds., 1966).
115. Arthur G. Tansley, The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms, 16 ECOL-
OGY 284 (1935).
116. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE (1949).
117. See DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1990). The late Charles J. Meyers traced the influence of this idea on
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radically disturbed by human intervention was the message of Rachel
Carson's indictment of chemical pesticides, Silent Spring,118 the book
perhaps most responsible for the environmental movement." 9
Interestingly, Roscoe Pound and ecology were once again joined
in the late 1960s. Pound's theory of interest recognition helped pave
the way for environmentalism to take its place among traditional in-
terests such as the conservation of natural resources. Science was
used to define the environmental interest to be protected, although
ironically Clements was not the source of the science. Pound's theory
of the displacement of rights by interests formed the jurisprudential
basis of environmental protection but an ecological underpinning was
necessary to make it work. Interest analysis is crucial to environmen-
tal protection, because it rests neither on common law nor constitu-
tional rights, but on the theory that the careful study of science can
provide rational answers to management problems.
During the New Deal, resource managers slowly realized that
there was some trade-off between development and non-development
interests. The latter-usually denominated fish and wildlife or aes-
thetic values-were legitimate interests. However, they were clearly
subordinated to maximum economic development of our natural re-
sources for two reasons. The adverse consequences of unlimited de-
velopment were at best partially understood and thus were easy to
discount and it was difficult to measure non-economic interests. Ecol-
ogy helped to place environmental interests on an equal and some-
times higher position in interest balancing. Ecology was very much
part of the optimistic efforts of the physical and social sciences to de-
velop technocrat models of complex systems that would allow society
to avoid the irrational horrors of the modem world. 120
environmental law in his 1975 Addison Harrison lectures at Indiana University, Bloomington.
Charles J. Meyers, An Introduction to Environmental Thought: Some Sources and Some Criti-
cisms, 50 IND. L.J. 426 (1975).
118. RACHEL CARSON, SILENr SPRING (1962) (especially ch. 6, Earth's Green Mantle).
119. In his expansion of his path-breaking contribution to the environmental movement, for-
mer Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall writes that Carson's book "was a masterstroke ....
It shifted the debate over pesticides into a context where ecological, not economic, values would
predominate." STEWART L. UDALL, THE QuiET CRISIS AND THE NEXT GENERATION 200
(1988). For a more detailed review of her contribution to the environmental movement, which
reaches the same conclusion, see Linda J. Lear, Rachael Carson's Silent Spring, 17 ENVTL. HIST.
REV. 23 (1993).
120. Peter J. Taylor develops this analysis in Peter J. Taylor, Technocratic Optimism, H.T.
Odum, and the Partial Transformation of the Ecological Metaphor after World War II, 21 J. HIST.
BIOLOGY 213 (1988). The roots of this optimism lie in the efforts to develop universal social
"laws" to match social progress with the economic progress that technology supported by science
brought Europe in the 18th and 19th century. The story has been told many times. See, e.g.,
1994]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Eugene Odum made an important extension of ecosystem theory
by providing a general theory of ecosystem development and func-
tion.121 Perhaps more important for the subsequent development of
environmental law, he was understandable to an informed lay audi-
ence. Odum was the ecologist most read by the small group of social
scientists, lawyers and others who developed the first generation of
environmental regulation in the unique political environment of the
late 1960s and '70s between the end of the anti-war movement and
Watergate and the OPEC oil embargo. 122 "Environmentalists seized
upon the ecosystem concept as a way to maintain their faith in hol-
ism"'1 23 and to shore up their rapid political success with a universal
scientific justification.
For the non-scientist seeking wisdom in the late 1960s, Eugene
Odum's widely used and read textbook, Fundamentals of Ecology, in-
troduced policy makers and non-scientists to the potential of ecology.
Odum's brother, Howard, took Lindeman's trophic level theories and
reduced them to mechanical theories, linked to the hard sciences, of
how ecosystems function. 24 Eugene used the pyramidal model of the
food chain in an ecosystem to develop a powerful theory that ecosys-
tems were greater than the sum of their parts and inevitably
progressed to steady states through the processes of climax and suc-
cession. Odum's text provided an elegant, scientific neo-Kantian prin-
ciple upon which environmental regulation and assessment could rest:
Homeostasis at the organism level is a well known concept in physi-
ology .... We find that equilibrium between organisms and envi-
ronment may also be maintained by factors which resist change in
the system as a whole. Much has been written about this "balance
of nature" but only with the recent development of good methods
for measuring rates of function of whole systems has a beginning
been made in the understanding of the mechanisms involved.' 25
In retrospect, it is clear that ecology was not ready for its starring
role.126 At the time, however, policy makers accepted the theory un-
GERHARD MASUR, PROPHETS OF YESTERDAY: STUDIES IN EUROPEAN CULTURE, 1890-1914
(1961).
121. In Donald Worster's words, ecosystem development "ends in the happy state of order."
Donald Worster, The Ecology of Order and Chaos, in THE WEALTH OF NATURE: ENVIRONMEN-
TAL HISTORY AND THE ECOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 156, 160 (1993).
122. See id at 156-61.
123. GOLLEY, supra note 18, at 3.
124. "In the ecosystem model, species acted abstractly, like robots." GOLLEY, supra note 18,
at 106.
125. EUGENE P. ODUM, in collaboration with HOWARD T. ODUM, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOL-
OGY 25 (2d ed. 1959).
126. For example, little attention was given to the role of mathematical population ecology in
Odum's thinking. This problem is central to the science because Odum had long acknowledged
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critically. Some ecologists made it easy to ignore the debate especially
in the 1960s when they aspired to turn ecology into a big, mathemati-
cally based science like physics or molecular biology. 127 The regula-
tory implications of ecology were enthusiastically suggested by the
Ecological Society of America, which represented that ecologists had
the ability to deliver the requisite science to balance nature. In a
unique Joint House-Senate Colloquium, which laid the foundation for
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the Society's pub!ic
affairs committee prophesied that "ecology is ready for rapid growth
and development .... ,,128 The committee report was also not shy
about the social utility of the science. "When a theory of ecosystem
emerges, it will be one of the major synthesizing ideas in science per-
haps rivaled only by the theory of evolution through natural selec-
tion.' ' 129 The promise of ecology was embraced by a professor of
public administration at Indiana University at Bloomington, Lynton
K. Caldwell, who became the principal drafter of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act. In a series of influential articles in the 1960s,
130
he suggested that qualitative environmental standards could provide
the administrative coherence historically lacking in natural resources
policy.
We can now more clearly understand that Odum's theory of
ecosystem equilibrium is one of the last gasps of 19th century deter-
ministic science and was more descriptive than integrative. It was a
sophisticated and nuanced extension of Clements' theory of plant
communities as stable superorganisms as the consequence of a series
of successional stages leading to a superorganistic permanent cli-
max. 31 In elite science, deterministic theories had already been re-
placed by probabilistic ones but the shift came late to biology and
the tension between this branch of ecology's reductionist approach and his holistic theory of the
ecosystem. See MCINTOSH, supra note 6, at 200-01.
127. One manifestation of this ambition was the unfortunate separation of ecology into two
camps, the theoretical modelers and the experimental or field researchers, beginning in the
1930s. Peter Kareiva traces this split in Peter Kareiva, Reviewing the Dialogue between Theory
and Experiments in Population Ecology, in PERSPECTIVES IN ECOLOGICAL THEORY 68 (Jonathan
Roughgarden et al. eds., 1989).
128. Joint House Senate Colloquium to Discuss A National Policy for the Environment: Hear-
ing Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs and the Comm. on Science and
Astronautics, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1968).
129. Id. at 157.
130. E.g., Lynton K. Caldwell, Administrative Possibilities for Environmental Control, in Fu-
TURE ENVIRONMENTS OF NORTH AMERICA, supra note 114, at 648.
131. See Edward Goldsmith, Ecological Succession Rehabilitated, 15 ECOLOGIST 104, 108-09
(1985). The most readable history of modern ecology is WORSTER, supra note 5.
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even later to ecology.132 Ecologists reported varying levels of indeter-
minate results testing the paradigm, but many scientists glossed over
them because of an extreme case of "physics-envy."' 133 The point for
lawyers is that this internal debate was missed in the rush to imple-
ment Leopold's dictum to "think like a mountain" in the heady days
of the rise of environmentalism.
134
After the equilibrium paradigm was incorporated into environ-
mental law and policy, the science of ecology grew exponentially.
Ambitious theoretical models were developed to explain how ecosys-
tems functioned and large-scale field tests were funded. The ecosys-
tem remained the organizing unit which generated much useful
scientific knowledge, but the science did not develop the generaliz-
able, predictive information demanded by the environmental regula-
tory programs put in place in the 1970s.135 Cracks in Odum's steady-
state theories began to appear.1 36 However, once the basic structure
of environmental regulation was put in place in the 1970s, little atten-
tion was paid to the problems that the discipline was experiencing
moving from theory to scientifically and socially useful information.
The acceptance of risk as a basis for regulating toxic substances made
it easy to justify regulation in advance of scientific knowledge. 13
7
Environmental regulation transformed ecology from a science to
a moral vision of nature. After 1968, ecological-driven environ-
mentalism fundamentally changed the way in which the world is
viewed and the standards by which human action is judged. It raised
132. Daniel Simberloff traces this shift of ecology from deterministic to probabilistic theories
in his path-breaking paper Daniel Simberloff, A Succession of Paradigms in Ecology: Essential-
ism to Materialism and Probabilism, in CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN ECOLOGY 63 (Esa Saarinen ed.,
1982).
133. Joel E. Cohen, Mathematics as Metaphor, 172 SCIENCE 674 (1971) (reviewing ROBERT
ROSEN, DYNAMICAL SYSTEM THEORY IN BIOLOGY (1970)). Mark Sagoff, Ethics, Ecology, and
the Environment: Integrating Science and Law, 56 TENN. L. REV. 77 (1988), is an exhaustive and
insightful analysis of the tension between the culture of theoretical science which seeks universal
physical explanations and that of applied or normative science which seeks to apply science to a
specific objective.
134. Professor Eric T. Freyfogle of the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana has
emerged as one of the most passionate champions of Leopold. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, The
Land Ethic and Pilgrim Leopold, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 217 (1990).
135. See MCINTOSH, supra note 6, at 193-241, for a survey of the effort to develop systems
ecology in the 1960s and 70s.
136. For example, in the famous Hubbard Brook study, which developed the biomass ac-
cumulation model, the researchers found that "data showed that the steady-state or 'mature'
(climax) stage of forest development has higher nutrient losses than earlier stages, contrary to
the suggested trend that the later or stable stages should have minimum nutrient loss." Id. at 207.
137. See FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POL-
ICY 493-556 (1990) for the legal and political history of the partial substitution of risk for proof of
cause in fact as a justification for toxic substances regulation.
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the idea of ecological rationality to parity with economic rationality
and thus fatally wounded the western idea that man had a duty to
master nature.138 In the process, the homestatis paradigm was trans-
formed into an unquestioned and ethical principle. In the meantime,
the science of ecology rejected the paradigm, but lawyers and policy
makers have only begun to catch-up with post Odum-NEPA ecology.
B. The Non-Equilibrium Paradigm Arrives
Since its incorporation into environmental law and policy, the
equilibrium paradigm has undergone a Kuhnian revolution.139 Equi-
librium was flawed from the start but until recently many scientists
and policy makers thought that the problem was the lack of necessary
data rather than in the paradigm itself. The alternative paradigm was
not clearly articulated and widely accepted until the 1980s. With
pockets of resistance, the equilibrium paradigm has been replaced
with more hard-edged probabilistic theories of non-equilibrium.
These theories potentially undermine much of the resources manage-
ment, or in modern terms, biodiversity preservation strategies of clas-
sic environmental law based on the theory that it is enough to isolate
ecosystems of human contamination. Once again, ecology is following
physics as it owes much to chaos theory. Non-equilibrium ecology re-
jects the vision of a balance of nature. Change and instability are the
new constants. Further, it rejects the Romantic idea that nature
should be a place without humans and returns to the problem posed
by Genesis, how should one manage the Garden of Eden after it has
been invaded by humans?
In a path-breaking book, Daniel Botkin has "deconstructed" the
equilibrium paradigm as a misguided effort to match science to theo-
logical and scientific visions of a perfect universe. 140 His basic argu-
ment is that the images of nature which have influenced ecology are
static when in fact the kinds of problems that we face require a dy-
namic view of nature, which starts from the premises that human ac-
tion is one of the principal forces operating on ecosystems and that
system disturbances are both predictable and random. Ecosystems
are patches or collections of conditions that exist for finite periods of
138. See Robert V. Bartlett, Ecological Rationality: Reason and Environmental Policy, 8
ENVTL. ETHics 221 (1986).
139. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIc REVOLUTIONS (1962).
140. BOTKIN, supra note 117. Interestingly, the book seems to have attracted little attention
in the scientific journals when it was first published, with the exception of a laudatory review by




time.141 The accelerating interaction between humans and the natural
environment makes it impossible to return to an ideal state of na-
ture.142 At best, ecosystems can be managed rather than restored or
preserved, and management will consist of series of calculated risky
experiments. "[N]ature moves and changes and involves risks and un-
certainties and ... our judgments of our own actions must be made
against this moving image."'
1 43
As one ecologist recently commented, "The idea [of balance of
nature] makes good poetry but bad science. '144 The best evidence of
this paradigm shift is a short but extremely influential list, 20 Great
Ideas for Ecology for the 1990s, published in 1992 by no less than Eu-
gene P. Odum, 145 the distinguished ecologist who is more responsible
than any other for implanting in the minds of lawyers and policy mak-
ers the idea that natural systems tend toward equilibrium if left undis-
turbed. The first and over-arching great idea states that "an
ecosystem is a thermodynamically open, far from equilibrium sys-
tem."'1 46 The others are either a specific application of the non-equi-
librium principle or policy prescriptions to implement good
management-commentary as it were on the first principle. Adher-
ents of the non-equilibrium paradigm have pioneered a sophisticated
new applied science, conservation biology, to protect ecosystems from
human insults. 47 Conservation biology is a regulatory science, driven
mainly by the need to preserve endangered species, which seeks to
develop scientific standards that can be applied to regulatory criteria
and then to develop on-the-ground management strategies to meet
141. Dean L. Urban et al., Landscape Ecology, 37 BIOSCIENCE 119 (1987).
142. The philosophical basis for the new ecology can be found in Bill McKibben's widely
read The End of Nature, which argues the modem mind separates humanity from nature and
thus the romantic visions of harmony between humanity and nature are impossible. BILL T.
McKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (1989).
143. BOTKIN, supra note 117, at 190.
144. Quoted in Wallace Kaufman, How Nature Really Works, AMERICAN FORESTS, Mar.-
Apr. 1993, at 17, 18.
145. Eugene P. Odum, Great Ideas in Ecology for the 1990s, 42 BIOSCIENCE 542 (1992).
146. Id. Ironically, Odum cites the third edition of his classic text, EUGENE P. ODUM, BASIC
ECOLOGY (1983).
147. The leading text is CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: AN EVOLUTIONARY-ECOLOGICAL PER-
SPECTIVE (Michael E. Sould & Bruce A. Wilcox eds., 1980).
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those standards. 14 The basic objective is to manage nature to mimic
natural systems.
149
This symposium addresses the potential impact of the non-equi-
librium paradigm for environmental management. A distinguished
group of scientists and lawyers discuss the theory and practice of non-
equilibrium ecology and its potential legal implications. The basic
question underlying all the papers is whether the non-equilibrium par-
adigm undermines the case for biodiversity protection or whether it
both strengthens the case and makes it harder to achieve the objec-
tive. The new paradigm is the basis for the argument that since nature
is in flux, human change is just another flux to be tolerated, although
ecologists reject this argument because it undermines the functional,
historical and evolutionary limits of nature.
50
The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, by Professor
Judy Meyer of the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia,
one of the world's most important centers of ecology research, exam-
ines the rise of the non-equilibrium paradigm. Landscapes are now
viewed as shifting mosaics. The new paradigm does not justify human
activity as natural, as some argue; rather it calls for a more sophisti-
cated understanding of how ecosystems function and how they can be
managed for environmental values. In Some Principles of Conserva-
tion Biology, As They Apply to Environmental Law, Reed Noss of the
Universities of Idaho and Oregon State takes the non-equilibrium
paradigm from theory to practice. A new applied-theoretical science,
conservation biology, has emerged in the past fifteen years to main-
tain biodiversity in complex, often degraded ecosystems. His paper
focuses on the principles that the discipline has developed for the de-
sign of habitat reserves to give threatened, endangered and stressed
species a fighting chance to survive us.
In the third principal paper, Sustaining ESD in Australia, Helen
Endre-Stacy, Lecturer in Law at Queensland University of Technol-
ogy, takes a comparative and philosophical look at the potential appli-
cation of the non-equilibrium paradigm to the management of all
resources to promote environmental quality. Environmentalism's ini-
148. For a good short review of the early literature, see Bruce A. Wilcox and Dennis D.
Murphy, Conservation Strategy: The Effects of Fragmentation on Extinction, 125 AM. NATURAL-
IST 879 (1985).
149. See generally CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NATURE CON-
SERVATION PRESERVATION AND MANAGEMENT (Peggy L. Fiedler & Subodh K. Jain eds., 1992)
[hereinafter CONSERVATION BIOLOGY].
150. Steward T.A. Pickett et al., The New Paradigm in Ecology: Implications for Conserva-
tion Biology Above the Species Level, in CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, supra note 149, at 65.
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tial objective was to make environmental quality a relative factor to
be considered. This battle has now largely been won and the move-
ment's focus has shifted to the assured comprehensive and long-term
integration, if not dominance, of this perspective in all resource deci-
sion making. The process has been a bitter and messy one because the
choices have often been presented as environmental quality or eco-
nomic development. Sustainable development has been floated as an
idea to integrate these two choices, and the new ecology can inform
both the scientific and philosophical bases of the concept. Using Aus-
tralia's efforts to use environmentally sustainable development to
come to grips with the social costs of its past policies of encouraging a
mining and pastoral economy, Endre-Stacy applies the new ecology
and postmodern legal theory to raise a number of profound and chal-
lenging questions about the future of environmentalism. For example,
can western and neo-western legal systems, based on individual claims
and the immediate discovery of truth, accommodate what Professor
Meyer calls "natural connections in the landscape" and the constant
scientific uncertainty promised by the non-equilibrium paradigm?
What groups and communities can and should participate in the scien-
tific, political and ethical debates about sustainable development and
how should such participation be organized?
Three distinguished professors of environmental law comment on
the legal implications of the principal papers by posing a series of hard
questions which must be answered before we can use the insights of
the new paradigm to better manage the world's resource base. Profes-
sor William Rodgers of the University of Washington's comment
draws on his recent experience as chair of a National Research Coun-
cil/National Academy of Sciences committee on federal land acquisi-
tion policies. Adaptation of Environmental Law to the Ecologists'
Discovery of Disequilibria illustrates how the conception of land-
scapes as shifting mosaics collapses many of the traditional property
categories we have used to acquire interests in land. The mosaic image
also challenges the longstanding assumption that public land acquisi-
tion programs can acquire and maintain islands of ecological integrity
free from adverse external influence. Professor Robert Keiter of the
University of Utah has worked extensively with the frustrating
problems of creating ecosystem management units out of fragmented
public and private land patterns and management mandates and
draws on that experience to suggest the full implications of conserva-
tion biology. Conservation Biology and the Law: Assessing the Chal-
lenges Ahead discusses the principal legal obstacles to implementing
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Reed Noss' argument that biodiversity preservation should be our
first land management priority. The comment outlines the powerful
ideological and political factors that are currently locked in a battle to
establish the ecosystem management concept as the dominant public
land management paradigm or to preserve the nineteenth century vi-
sion of public lands as an endless commodity cornucopia, and the way
in which this struggle manifests itself in litigation and federal land
management initiatives. Professor Keiter concludes that both new
statutory management mandates and reserve programs as well as the
greater use of existing federal and state land management authority
are needed to legitimize and to institutionalize the ecosystem manage-
ment concept.
In the final comment, Professor Christopher Stone of the Univer-
sity of Southern California Law Center draws on his extensive writ-
ings in environmental ethics and international environmental law to
ask about Deciphering "Sustainable Development". The comment
sharply challenges Professor Endre-Stacy's assumption that the sus-
tainable development debates reflect an "intellectual chasm" between
environmentalists and developers and argues instead that they reflect
a clash of real and perhaps intractable interests, namely the rich and
the poor, and that both interests are legitimate and must be accommo-
dated. He proposes an alternative approach based on identifying com-
mon interests rather than changing the mode of discourse. Professor
Stone finds that some of Endre-Stacy's proposals, such as local partici-
pation, promote consensus but that her idea of "unceasing dialogue"
needs to be more fully articulated before it can serve as a guide to the
promotion of environmental protection and sustainable development
in many of the situations he identifies.
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